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Statements in the 1990s: Confrontation  
between the Military Lobby and Civil Society 
The year 2012 marked the twentieth anniversary of plans 
to transition the Russian armed forces to voluntary per-
sonnel procurement while decreasing their strength. This 
military policy objective was included for the first time 
in 1992 in a statement of the Supreme Soviet of the Rus-
sian Federation. Society demanded changes, including 
military reform, and claimed it was prepared to support 
its implementation. Soldiers were encouraged to sign 
voluntary contracts. However, the crackdown on the Con-
gress of People’s Deputies (the “Second Putsch” of October 
1993), along with the launch of military operations in 
Chechnya in December 1994, shelved the implementation 
of these plans for some time.
As Russians began to hear of military crimes in Chech-
nya and unjustified large-scale losses among conscript 
soldiers and civilians, the anti-war movement expanded 
rapidly, leading to a sharp decline in Boris Yeltsin’s 
popularity. As a response, the Russian president adopted 
a number of populist measures in the run-up to the 1996 
elections. These included a decree on the introduction of 
“enlistment personnel procurement and the abolition of 
conscription” in the armed forces as of spring 2000. Two 
years later, during the preparation of the second Chechen 
campaign, the decree was amended – inconspicuously, as 
far as the public debate was concerned – with the phrase 
“if and when necessary conditions are created.” This 
postponed the abolition of conscription indefinitely. At 
the meeting of the Russian Federation’s Security Council 
in November 2000, in spite of the ongoing second war in 
Chechnya, the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, 
nonetheless signed the decision on transition to “the 
entirely contractual” armed forces. These plans, too, have 
been frozen in time. 
A Semi-professional Military
Problems Facing the Russian Armed Forces 
in the Effort to Transition to a Contract Army 
Andrey Kalikh
Throughout the post-Soviet period, there have been continuous discussions in  Russia 
about the need to abolish compulsory military service and create a professional 
army in its place. Although three Russian presidents declared their determination to 
 reorganize the armed forces, however, all attempts to create an entirely  contractual 
military have failed. Today there are some signs that the military is modernizing, 
suppor ted by reports that professional Russian troops are participating in operations 
in Ukraine. In order to create a fully combat-effective professional military, however, a 
number of major reforms are needed. The soldier’s legal status needs to be raised, 
service conditions for contract soldiers should be improved, and authentic civilian 
oversight should be established over the military.
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These reform attempts, along with ambitious statements 
of the 1990s, reflected the intense discussions that were 
underway within Russian society about the model for the 
military. At the time the overwhelming majority of citi-
zens favored abolishing conscript armed forces. This was 
during the short period when the government listened 
to public opinion, despite considerable resistance from 
agencies in power. To the reactionary siloviki (members 
of the Russian ruling elite who have ties to state security 
and intelligence organs), the war in Chechnya offered 
a solution to many problems; it allowed them gradually 
to bury democratic reforms, boost their influence, and 
increase the military budget. Reforms were frozen before 
they could take hold, signifying the victory of the military 
lobby over civil society.
Mixed Military as a Compromise: 
Draft and Enlistment
Interestingly, since none of the above-mentioned goals 
have officially been cancelled, they still remain valid. 
Nevertheless the state has been gradually moving away 
from the idea of entirely contractual armed forces. In 
2002 the government adopted a more pragmatic concept 
that reinforced the mixed personnel procurement – both 
conscription and contract-based.1 
The Federal Target Program (FTP) was developed for 
2004–07 to aid transition to enlistment of some of the 
forces in constant combat readiness. Its stated goal was 
to enlist at least 135,000 professional soldiers by 2008 
(which would have constituted 40 to 45 percent of private 
corps and junior command personnel).2 This was not a 
simple attempt at reform, in spite of the announced goal: 
to “transition to a professional military.”3 Rather the pro-
gram was intended merely to raise the necessary number 
of enlisted troops.
A system of incentives was introduced to increase 
the attractiveness of the contractual military service. 
Wages were increased; a mortgage system was created to 
provide housing to military personnel; access to higher 
education was facilitated; and other perks were offered. 
These enticements did not attract sufficient recruits, how-
ever. At the end of the FTP’s period of validity, the target 
was lowered to 125,000. According to experts, moreover, 
after 2007 the real number of enlistees never exceeded 
100,000. At the same time, the program’s cost actually 
went up to 99 billion rubles (3,960 million US dollars) 
from the initially budgeted 79 billion rubles (3,160 million 
dollars at the 2007 exchange rate). 4 
Despite this overspending, the program was not ful-
filled. After it ended, the Ministry of Defense announced 
that it would be impossible to create professional military 
forces in the Russian environment. The reverse process 
began: reducing the number of enlisted forces and increas-
ing conscription. During the implementation of FTP, the 
number of conscripts had not exceeded 130,000 to 140,000, 
but by 2008–09 it had more than doubled, up to 305,000, 
due to the cancellation of military service deferments 
and exemptions. Although the number of conscripts has 
decreased over the last few years, it still exceeds the scale 
of conscriptions during the FTP implementation.
Difficulties meeting social promises formed the main 
impediment to the FTP’s successful implemention. En-
listed personnel did not receive fair wages; free housing 
either turned out to be a lie or was provided only when 
bribes changed hands; the lengthy term of the first con-
tract – three years – also frightened soldiers away.
Instances of serious criminal coercion also piled up. 
According to military service law, a contract could only be 
concluded after the first six months of compulsory military 
service had been served. When this first half year was 
about to end, commanders would not merely try to per-
suade soldiers to sign contracts but often used violence to 
coerce them. Typically commanders had a vested interest, 
as they were awarded a bonus for meeting enlistment tar-
gets. Recruitment therefore became a source of corruption. 
Newly enlisted soldiers now became victims of extortion, 
deprived of rights as before, but with a different salary 
scheme. The fundamental principle of professional mili-
tary service – its voluntary basis – was thereby infringed.5 
Attempts to Modernize the Armed Forces 
There were no rousing statements about the transition to 
the professional armed forces after 2007 for it was already 
obvious that the FTP was failing. Mistakes committed in 
the Russian-Georgian military conflict in South Ossetia in 
August 2008 nonetheless made clear the need for urgent 
reforms. In the absence of professional forces, the major-
ity of the Russian “peacekeepers” entering Georgia were 
inexperienced conscript soldiers. This military opera-
tion brought to light numerous problems, such as lack 
of mobility, lack of professionalism, poor command and 
control, and obsolete munitions that led to unwarranted 
casualties. Sheer necessity brought about changes that, 
this time, were not called “reforms” but “modernization” 
and “refashioning” of the armed forces. 
A brief period of liberalization under President Dmitry 
Medvedev contributed to a renewed modernization effort. 
Anatoly Serdyukov, a civilian appointed to head the min-
ister of defense in February 2007, carried out significant 
structural reforms of the military before being dismissed 
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from his post in 2012. Serdyukov reduced the strength of 
the commissioned staff, carried out large-scale structural 
changes – namely considerably reducing ground forces, 
navy, and air force units – and improved overall manage-
ment structure and strategic command.6 
In addition to this, beginning in 2008 the length of 
conscript service was shortened first from 24 to 18 months, 
and then from 18 to 12 months. Its purpose changed as 
well: creating and maintaining a mobilization reserve 
was declared the sole goal of conscription. Henceforth, 
the focus for conscripted soldiers would only be improv-
ing their qualifications. The country’s external security 
was to be entrusted to professionals. Despite setting yet 
another ambitious goal for itself, the military remained as 
dependent as ever on conscripts into the next decade. 
In addition to reducing the length of service – a devel-
opment seen in altogether positive terms by conscripts 
and the public alike – various less popular measures were 
also introduced. These included cancellation of a number 
social deferments and exemptions from military service. 
Fathers of children under the age of three, husbands of 
pregnant wives, rural teachers and doctors, children of 
invalids and pensioners, workers in defense plants, police 
school cadets, priests, and those who had been exempted 
from the military service by president’s order (such as 
outstanding scientists or actors) were stripped of their 
deferment rights. Drafting these categories of people 
hardly increased the military’s proficiency, but it dealt 
blows to the social protection of potential soldiers and to 
the country’s intellectual wealth, and it further increased 
conscription-related corruption. 
The Gains and Drawbacks of Modernization
Thanks to the Serdyukov–Medvedev reforms of  2007–11, 
important steps were taken within the military service 
away from the model of armed forces based on large-
scale mobilization. At that time contractual military 
service became more appealing and, as a result, the num-
bers of contract soldiers increased. President Medvedev 
was quick to label this “the beginning of the transition 
toward the professional military.”7 In 2008–09, however, 
the numbers of enlisted soldiers barely reached 85,000–
90,000. From the end of 2009, their numbers were on 
the rise again. According to the General Staff, in 2011 
there were 174,000 contract soldiers.8 In 2012 the old-new 
President Vladimir Putin signed a decree stating that no 
less than 50,000 contract soldiers had to be enlisted in the 
armed forces annually; by the end of 2016, the number of 
contract soldiers should reach 425,000.9 
As the Ministry of Defense does not disclose data, it is dif-
ficult to estimate whether President Putin’s plan is being 
fulfilled, but it is known that there were 225,000 contract 
soldiers in early 2014, which, according to experts, is 
behind schedule.10 This indicates that the problem of the 
low appeal of military service persists. 
Russia does in fact have a successful example of con-
tractual service, however. The Russian Federation’s bor-
der service (a subdivision of the Federal Security Service, 
or FSB) has been entirely professional since 2008. 
The military modernizations of 2007–11 did not involve 
genuine reform but rather dealt purely with externalities 
that did nothing to alter the essentially Soviet charac-
ter of the Russian armed forces. Conscription survived. 
Soldiers remained defenseless against the violation of 
their civil rights. Military justice and judiciary reform did 
not take place. The Russian military remained a state in-
stitution impenetrable to civilian oversight. As far as the 
amount of bribes is concerned, the conscription process 
is second only to the education and health sectors, which 
are equally corrupt. This in no small measure is a conse-
quence of conscription.11 
The crime rate in the military continues to be high. 
Dedovshchina (the hazing, brutalization, and bullying of 
younger servicemen at the hands of older servicemen and 
commanders) is tacitly regarded as a way of maintain-
ing discipline in military units. These days hazing in the 
military is nothing less than extortion or illegal canvass-
ing under threat of torture. In addition to hazing, there 
is a wide-scale illegal use of soldier labor, often with 
the features of modern slavery. Journalists and activists 
have monitored and recorded cases in which soldiers are 
rented out to civilians as laborers.12
Corruption has also affected the top echelons of the 
military leadership. In 2012 Anatoly Serdyukov, the 
minister of defense who began implementing reforms 
in 2007, was dismissed from his post after a corruption 
scandal surrounding the joint-stock company Oboron-
service (Defense Service) started to unfold. Later he also 
testified about the illegal use of soldier labor for personal 
purposes.13 Despite allegations of corruption amounting 
to billions of rubles, he was granted amnesty in 2013.14 
The Results of Halfway Reforms:  
Mass Character and Excessive Cost
Despite cuts made under Serdyukov, the strength of the 
armed forces contracted only slightly, from 1.2 million 
to 1 million personnel. Nevertheless, according to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, the numbers 
of Russian military personnel in 2012 remained among 
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the highest in the world – that is, 3 to 4 million, and on 
the basis of operational forces – or 20.6 people per 1000 
citizens.15 Apart from the Ministry of Defense, 11 other 
agencies involve military service; these include the 
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Emergencies, the Fe-
deral Security Service (FSB), and the Federal Protection 
Service. 
According to data provided by the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, Russia has the third 
highest military spending in the world: 87.8 billion dol-
lars.16 Defense spending on such budget items as “national 
defense” and “national security” is estimated to amount 
to 3.5 to 4 percent of GDP. Taking account of expenditures 
concealed within other budget items, however, would 
raise the estimate for defense spending to 5 to 6 percent 
of GDP, making Russian military spending among the 
highest in the world.17
Thus, having undergone rather significant changes 
over the last ten years, the Russian Federation’s armed 
forces have nonetheless inherited and preserved the main 
features of the Soviet armed forces: mass character, low 
mobility, and excessive cost.
Social Aspects of Modernization 
Significant efforts by the state are indeed helping the 
Russian armed forces gain in might, but the overall social 
environment of this modernization has hardly been af-
fected. The military is more popular than ever. According 
to opinion polls, 86 percent of the population currently 
supports the armed forces, while only 7 percent favors 
universal military service. Most Russians support the idea 
of mixed armed forces, partially based on the draft and 
partially based on enlistment.18
Analysis of the increase in service pay for members 
of the military during the implementation of the Fed-
eral Target Program (in 2004–07) amply illustrates the 
social ineffectiveness of the reforms. This increase had 
very little effect on the private corps or junior command 
personnel (sergeants, sergeant-majors), whereas salaries 
for officers of the central office of the Ministry of Defense 
enjoyed the most growth. Most importantly, according to 
data from May 2014, the service pay for a soldier offered a 
contract to sign voluntarily (17,400 rubles, or 497 dollars) 
is substantially below average national wages (33,280 
rubles, or 950 dollars).19
Though the armed forces have been restructured, their 
social composition remains unchanged. The military is 
still the realm of young men from families of low social 
status, especially in the provinces, where access to other 
means social advancement is limited. Those who live in 
areas with high unemployment – namely in small towns, 
rural settlements, or villages – are more likely to sign a 
contract than their urban counterparts. 
The Russian Armed Forces and Ukraine 
The events of 2014 in Ukraine and the ongoing situation 
there show that modernization of Russia’s armed forces 
has had some success despite the extensive costs. It has 
been noted that members of the Russian military par-
ticipating in the annexation of Crimea – and later aiding 
separatist fighters in eastern Ukraine – showed high 
levels of professionalism. The practically bloodless opera-
tion in Crimea indicated that the military had modified 
its tactics. Effectiveness increased, while the number of 
participating military personnel decreased.
It is worth recalling the fact that, as late as 2008, 
Russia was not able to deploy its forces to South Ossetia 
within two weeks. By 2014, everything looked very differ-
ent on the border with Ukraine. Substantial forces made 
up of professional soldiers were deployed within days to 
Russia’s southern Rostov region, which borders Ukraine. 
Russia of course denies that its military personnel 
has been participating in the conflict in eastern Ukraine 
in spite of numerous statements by human rights activ-
ists and independent media. Activists investigating the 
involvement of Russian soldiers in the conflict in Ukraine 
are being persecuted. Lev Shlosberg, a journalist and 
politician from Pskov, was beaten after publishing infor-
mation about the secret funerals of paratroopers from 
Pskov who were killed in combat.20 Ludmila Bogatenkova, 
chairwoman of the advocacy organization “Mothers of 
 Prikumye” (Stavropol Region), spent several days in a 
pre-trial detention center after she made public a list of 
Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. Two criminal cases 
have been initiated against Bogatenkova accusing her of 
petty crime and taking bribes.21
In response to these investigations, the Russian leader-
ship and the Ministry of Defense still maintain that the 
soldiers died during military training exercises in the 
Rostov region across the border.22
The analyst Alexandre Golts, along with other human 
rights activists, has no doubt that Russia is conducting a 
covert operation in eastern Ukraine. Russian authorities 
imply that Russian servicemen are there undercover, but 
if any are killed or captured, Russia would never admit 
they belonged to their own armed forces.23 By February 
2015, there were widespread reports of Russian profes-
sional servicemen “volunteering” in eastern Ukraine 
during their “vacation time.”24
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For its part, the Russian state propaganda machine has 
succeeded in persuading citizens that Russia is acting 
appropriately toward Ukraine. The Russian majority ap-
proves the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, supports 
separatists in eastern Ukraine, and condemns the change 
in Ukrainian leadership that took place in the country 
in early 2014.
Conclusion
The Russian Federation’s inconsistent actions to reform 
the armed forces are symptomatic of stark differences 
between the country’s military and political leadership 
dating as far back as the 1990s. The subsequent history of 
attempts to reform shows how political leadership went 
over to the side of the military lobby, which indefinitely 
postponed topical reforms. 
One can conclude from an analysis of the legal status 
of soldiers that the importance of the draft-based armed 
forces has always been underestimated – both during 
Soviet and post-Soviet times. Throughout, is has mostly 
been considered as a way to mobilize society. This at-
titude is a very important factor when evaluating the 
armed forces’ operational capability. 
Yet this attitude began to change in 2008, after the war 
with Georgia, when serious modernization and rearma-
ment of the ground forces and the navy started to take 
place. This suggests the leadership’s growing ambition to 
employ the armed forces in local conflicts. Right now the 
focus is on the professional portion of the armed forces as 
a shock vanguard that can be used effectively in local con-
flicts. EU countries such as Germany should by all means 
take this change in strategy into account. 
Despite the improvements recently undergone by the 
Russian armed forces, they are not in the same league as 
their Western counterparts in terms of logistical support, 
technical and combat equipment, experience gained 
through participation in training and exercises, or – most 
importantly – the level of social protection for military 
personnel. An army made up of powerless soldiers can ne-
ver become truly effective or combat-effective. The prin-
cipal threats to Russia’s security are therefore corruption, 
criminality, and the lack of transparency within its armed 
forces and agencies drawing on military forces. Moderni-
zation should not only mean rearmament but improving 
the quality of the service environment.
To change the situation and improve the defense capac-
ity of the Russian armed forces as a whole, it is necessary 
to improve the legal status of both drafted and contract 
soldiers. This in turn requires the implementation of au-
thentic public and parliamentary oversight – supervisory 
bodies to oversee defense and security spending, re-
equipment of the armed forces, and soldiers’ legal status. 
Organizing a broad public discussion of military reform 
goals and implementation methods is a good place to 
start. Without such a discussion, no transition to effective 
and professional armed forces will be possible.
Andrey Kalikh is a human rights activist and a freelance 
journalist based in Saint Petersburg. He is also the 
 coordinator of the working group Fighting Transborder 
Corruption at the  EU-Russia Civil Society Forum  
(http://eu-russia-csf.org). 
Translated by Irina Terechenkova.
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